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The "heterodox shock" approach to stabilization is based on a
flawed concept of inflation. The countries that entered this path
are likely to remain for a long time under a controlled economy,
sacrificing their growth potential for some stability in income
distribution and less explosive inflation.
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The theoretical basis for the "heterodox shocks"  Eventually this "muddling through" policy
recently implemented in Argentina and Brazil is  may break down, precipitating hyperinflation
that chronic inflation is essentially inertial - the  and consequent structural changes - but this
product of staggered prices and wage adjust-  does not seem to be an imminent or even a
ments.  The underlying assumpton  is that the  necessary outcome.
economic process is a cooperative game. With-
out legal and other forms of coercion, however,  A basic flaw of the "heterodox" stabilization
individuals tend to cheat - to fix their prices  programs was to assume that stabilizing the
above average to start with.  price level (through a general freeze) was a
precondition for fiscal equilibrium and eventual
The inertial hypothesis of inflation is a good  fiscal reform - instead of the reverse. The fiscal
description of the dynamics of inflation but it is  austerity eromised after stabilization was never
not a theory of the nature of inflation - so the  accomplished - blocked by bureaucrats and
proposed remedy (the "heterodox shock")  special interest groups interested in maintaining
cannot be implemented successfully.  the status quo. The challenge in these countries
is to devise economic programs that could make
Moreover, applying that kind of shock  long-term stabilization programs viable and
destroys the spontaneous operation of the price  politically acceptable.
system by suppressing the information content
conveyed by prices and by distorting the alloca-  In this sense, stabilization is less a technical
tion of resources.  economic problem than an intertemporal politi-
cal problem of how to compensate the losers, on
Once a government engages in such an  the one hand, and on the other hand to convince
experiment, it is led to repeat it periodically to  the majority that the trade-off between sacrificed
survive. The countries that entered this path are  current consumption and increased future
likely to remain for a long time under a con-  consumption is worthwhile. The precarious
trolled economy, sacrificing their growth  political systems in these countries have been
potential on behalf of some stability in income  unable to deal with conflicts and support consis-
distribution and less explosive inflation.  tent long-term policies.
This paper is a background paper for the 1988 World Development Report. Copies
are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.
Please contact Lupita Mattheisen, room S13-067, extension 33757 (36 pages with
charts and tables).
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FIgures  341.  The  Institutional  Setting
Institutional  disorder  and  legal  permissiveness  makes
it  difficult  to  define  tEe  public  sector  in  Brazil  in  any
precise  waj.  Consequently,  onlyj  approximate  measures  of  the
size  of  the  public  secto  r  And  of  fiscal  actions  are
possible.  The  lack  of  transparency  in  public  accounts  and
actions  is  frequently  put  to  political  use;  it  is  a
convenient  set  up  for  the  administration  to  accomodate
conflicting  groups  and  win  political  support  without  the
close  scrutiny  of  other  special  interests  and  of  society  as
a  whole.  It  is  not  accidental  that  no  substantial  progress
in  the  organization  and  modernization  of  the  public  sector
has  been  made.  Fiscal  reform  in  a  broad  sense  would
necessarily  involve  the  partial  dismantling  of  the  network
of  privileges,  preferential  treatment,  entitleme,its  tc;
income  sources,  transfers  and  the  multitude  of  government
actions  that  benefit  special  groups  in  societN.  This  is  the
political  dimension  of  fiscal  policy  that  is  usually
overlooked  in  economic  analyses  of  developing  economies'-.
In  a  broad  sense,  the  public  sector  comprises  four
branches  the  central  (federal)  government,  the  monetary
authoriti,  the  state-owned  enterprises  (both  financial  and
non-financial),  and  the  state  and  municipal  governments
(with  their  own  microcosms  of financial  and  non-financial
enterprises).  The  interaction  betweem  these  branches  is
complex,  in  the  sense  that  the  real  direction  of
subordination  and  control  is  loose  and  informal,  and  the
1. Lao's  description  of  the "transfer  state" captures  the political  economn  aspect  of fiscal
policy  in  many developing countries.  Cf.  D.  Lao,  "The Political  Econouy  of  Economic
Liberalization",  The  World Bank  Economic  Review,  V.I,  n. 2 (January, 1987).
-1  -Penalties  for transgressions  usuallyj  non-existent.  The best
representation  of the public  sector  is perhaps  one  in  which
different  collusions  of  interests  interact,  the  final
outcome  depending  on the economic  and Political  strength  of
each party.  Planning  and control  have no real chance  in such
a  s!stem,  so that the resulting  fiscal  actions  are  largely
unpredictable,  depending  on  the  momentary  needs  of  the
syst  em.
Table  I  is  an  attempt  at  identifying  the types  of
fiscal  actions  taken  by the Public  sector.  It is clear  from
the  Table  that the modes  of government  intervention  in the
economy  are divesified  and pervasive,  causing  first  order
impacts  on  resource  allocation,  income  d;tribution,
macroeconomic  balance,  and  capacity  growth  In  this
institutional  setting,  it has  been a mistake  to  n.oncentrate
economic  analysis  on the public  sector deficit  as a primary
source  of instabilitu  in the  economy.  The deficit  is but one
of the manifestations  - perhaps  not even the  major  one - of
the  deeper  and  broader  problem  of the hNpertroph!  of the
State.  The Keynesian  vice of looking  at the deficit  as  the
measure  of  fiscal policyg  has distracted  attention  from the
more  fundamental  issue  of the organization,  the  functions,
and  the limits  of the government.
In  Brazil  and  in many other  developing  countries,  the
government  makes  the  law and changes  it  according  to  its
momentary  needs  to  serve  specific  interests  of social  and
economic  groups  that happen  to be  politically  influential.
Government  actions,  of course,  are usually  disguised  under
morally  or economically  undisputable  motives  such as  social
justice,  national  sovereignit!j, economic  growth,  maintenance
of high  employment,  alleviation  of poverty  and so forth. The
absense  of  solid  legal  and  social  institutions  which  could
check  the discretionary  power  of the government  then  leads
to  a  kind  of  economic  dictatorship  of the groups  that
dominate  the state  bureaucracy  and collude  to improve  their
own  interests  at the expenses  of  society  in general.
-2 -On  the  other  hand,  the  intricate  collection  of laws,
regulations,  taxes,  subsidies,  market  reserves,  preferential
treatment,  and  so on, designed  to protect  personal,  sectoral
or regional  interests,  distort  the allocation  of  resources
and  reduce  the overall  productivity  of the economy.  As the
more  organized  interests  are those  of the upper  classes,  it
is  likely  that  the  whole  syjstem  of policy  produce  a more
concentrate  Personal  income  distribution  than  would  be
feasible  in a more  liberal  system.
At  the  macroeconomic  level,  the  economy  has  shown  an
acute  instability  in real  income  and  the price  level  which
can  not  be  mainly  attributed,  as usual,  to external  or
autonomous  shocks,  but  result  from  the  vagaries  and  the
inconsistency  of domestic  economic  policies,  implemented  in
an institutional  set-up  which  makes  persistencyj and  control
impossible  to accomplish.
The absence  of predictable  government  behavior  enforced
by  law and social  sanction,  together  with the  size and  the
variety  of  possible  fiscal  actions,  has  inhibited  the
organization  of  longer  term  financial  and  futures  markets,
given  the  prohibitive  risks  involved.  Therefore,
intertemporal  linkages  in  the  economy  are  thin  and
insufficient,  probably  producing  a  sub-optimal  level  of
investment  an  lower  than  otherwise  capacity  growth.  The
amount  of noise  and uncertaintyj introduced  by fiscal actions
in the economy  has  not  been  sufficientlI  appreciated  in
macroeconomic  analyses  of Latin  American  countries.
In the case  of Brazil,  fiscal  reform  or at least  fiscal
discipline  has been  blocked  by a tripartite  collusion  among
ideologists  of the state  (socialists  of various  colors),  the
state  bureaucracy,  and private  special  interests.  Despite  a
growing  perception  and conviction  byj society  at large  that
a fiscal  reform  will  be eventually  required,  any  step  in
that  direction  has  been  frustrated  by the organized  and
strategically  located  members  of the collusion
Fiscal  reform,  however,  is at the root of any permanent
-3-effort  at  stabilization  and  long  run  structural  reforms
aiming  at liberalizing  and modernizing  the economic  system.
A  basic  flaw  of  the  recent  "heterodox"  stabilization
programs  in  Latin  America  was  to assume  that stabilization
of the price  level  (through  a general  freeze)  was  a  pre-
condition  for  fiscal  equilibrium  and  an eventual  fiscal
reform  and  not  vice-versa.  Promises  of  future  fiscal
austerity  were  never  accomplished  after  the stabilization,
blocked  bs the groups  interested  in the  permanence  of  the
status  quo.  A  major  challenge  in  these  countries  is to
devise  economic  programs  that  could  make  long  term
stabilization  viable  and  Politically  acceptable.  In this
sense,  stabilization  is  much  less  a  technical  economic
problem  than  an  intertemporal  political  Problem  of now to
compensate  the  loosers,  on the one hand,  and how to convince
the majority  that  the trade-off  between  sacrificed  current
consumption  and  increased  future consumption  is favorable,
on the  other  hand.  The precarious  political  systems  in these
countries  have  been  incompetent  to deal  with  conflicts  and
to support  consistent  long term economic  pclicies.
-4-The  Struwt.  Qe  of  the  Public  Sector
and the  N  :ure  of  Fiscal  Actions
------------------------------------------------------------
BRANCH  TYPE nF FISCAL  ACTION
------------------------------------------------------------
. Level  and composition  of expenditure
. Changes  in tax  rates  and  tax base
. Subsidies  and transfers  to private  sector
Central  Governrient  . Domestic  and  foreign  government  debt
. Public  investment  programs
Loan  guarantees  to Public  and private
sectors
P  Price  and wage  controls  over private  sector
. Commercial  policies
R  Regulations  implUing  subsidies  and/  or
blocking  access  to markets
A  Automatic  financing  of federal  deficits
. Loans  to other  segments  of public  sector
S  selective  credit
Monetary  Authority  Loan  guarantees
Management  of domestic  and  foreign  public
debt
Exchange  controls  (multiple  exchange  rates)
------------------------------------------------------------- __-
C  Current  and capital  transfers  from Treasury
T  Investment  and  financing  programs
Public  Eterprises  . Employment,  wage  and price  policies
Domestic  arrears  to private  sector
Selective  credit  (financial  enterprises)
----------------------------------------------------- __---------
. Level  and composition  of expenditure
. Transfers  from central  government
State  and  Local  Investment  and  financing  programs
Governments  Domestic  and  foreign  debt
Domesti.c  arrears  to private  sector  and  to
Central  Bank or federal  banks.
---------------------------- 5----------------------------------__
-5-2. The Public  Sector  Deficit
The  public  sector  deficit  has been a  matter  of  conceptual
and pratical  controversy  in Brazil,  both due to the difficulty  of
deining  the  size  if  th 1e  public  sector  and to the effects  of
inflation  and  indexation  on the public  accounts.  The best  known
concept,  and  the one we are going  to use  in most of this  paper,
is the  Public  Sector  Borrowing  Requirement  (PSBR)  referring  to
the  non-financial  public  sector  (all levels of government  and
state-owned  enterprises).  Due  to the chronic  and high  inflation
and  to the  formal  indexation  schemes,  the  inflation-adjusted  or
.operational"  PSBR  is the adequate  concept  to measure  the  impact
of  the  deficit  on the  real sector  of the economuy  (see section
3).
An alternative  concept  for the  financing  needs  of the  public
sector  has been  Produced  by the Central  Bank since  1981.  It  is
the  change  in the net  debt of the public  sector  (NDPS),  which
takes  account  of the changes  in the  net  assets  of  the  public
sector  against  the private  sector  and the  rest of the world.
The  two  concepts  in fact measure  different  things  and are
usefull  for  different  purposes.  Table  I  summarizes  the
alternative  measures  as percentages  of GDP  for the period  1981-
87.  Both the  nominal  PSBR  and the  nominal  change  in the NDPS  are
dominated  by  inflationary  effects  operating  through  monetary
correction  and  exchange  rdte  devaluation  on the debt/  assets.
They  are defective  measures  for  analytical  purposes,  but  not
invalid  policy  tar-gets.  In fact, the setting  of a nominal  target
for the  financing  of the  public  sector,  as  is  usual  ir. the
stabilization  programs  inspired  by the IMF, introduces  a built-in
stabilizer  in the economy  to the extent  that the degree  of  fiscal
stringencyg  becomes  a  direct  function  of the rate of inflation.
The two  real or inflation-adjusted  concepts  of Table  I have  shown
large  discrepancies,  stemming  from  the  fact  that,  while  the
- 6  -operational  PSBR takes  out both  monetary  correction  and exchange
rate  devaluation  from the change  in the non;inal  stocks,  the real
change  in  NDPS  takes  out  the effective  inflation  rate  from the
change  in the  nominal  stocks.  Year to year discrepancies  between
monetary  correction  and/  or  exchange  rate  devaluation  and
inflation  produce  different  movements  in the  two  concepts.  The
sears  1983 and  1986 provide  opposite  examples  of the differences
in measurement.  In 1983 there  was a 30X  real devaluation,  while
in  1986  there  was a 15X real appreciation  of the exchange  rate.
In 1983 monetars  correction  was  close  to inflation,  while  in 1986
the government  "de-indexed"  the  financial  assets,  obtaining  a
capital  gain  on  its  outstanding  debt.  As a consequence,  the
operational  PSBR  was much  smaller  than  the real NDPS  in 1983  and
higher  in  1986.  From  an economic  point  of view,  the eventual
capital  gains  and  losses  on the public  debt should  be  included,
to  the  extent  that  them alleviate  or aggravate  future potential
deficits.  This makes  the  real NDPS a  better  concept  than  the
operational  PSBR as a long term measure  of the deficit.
The  difficults  with  the NDPS concept,  as it is measured  in
Brazil,  derives  from the equal  treatment  given  to  assets  and
liabilities  of the public  sector.  The assets  of the public  sector
are basically  domestic  credit  advanced  bY the Central  Bank  to the
financial  sector  (here  included  Banco  do  Brasil  and  the
commercial  banks  owned  by the state  governments).  These  credits
refer  mostls  to  subsidized  credit  programs  of  the  Federal
government  administered  by  Banco  do  Brasil  and  to  financial
assistance  to state-owned  banks.  It is at least doubtful  whether
these  credits  are  fulls  recoverable  or  a  substantial  discount
should  be  imposed  on  them.  The  nominal  and  real  NDPS  are
presented  in Tables  2 and 3 for the period  1981-87.
The methodological  base  for the real  NDPS  concept  derives
from  the consolidation  of the non-financial  public  sector  with
the Central  Bank,  Producing  the  following  equation:
(1)
D= (B - pB) +  H +  (C-pC)  +  E(B*  +  te-p) B*)  - E(R*  +  te-p)R*)
-7-where  D is the deficit,  B  is the stock  of  domestic  d¢bt,  H is
the  monetars  base,  C  is  net  domestic  credit  of th-  financial
system  to the  public  sector,  E  is the exchange  rate,  8* is  the
stock  of foreign  public  debt,  R*  is the stc.k  of international
reserves,  p is the rate of inflation,  and e  is  the  rate  of
exchange  rate  devaluation
Domestic  financing  can  take  the  form  of  government
securities,  moneN  creation  or net  bank  credit  to  the  public
sector,  while  external  financing  can  be  an expansion  a  the
forei!  public  debt or a run-down  of foreign  exchange  r,  -ves.
Lookir.q  at Table  2 we see that the average  proportion  of the net
domestic  debt has  remained  around  40X  in  the  period,  despite
sharp  changes  in international  financial  market  conditions  after
1982.  The reasons  for that are,  first,  that Brazil  received  new
money  in 1983 and  1984, and,  second,  that  at the margin  there  was
a  transfer  of foreign debt  from the private  to the public  sector
in the period.  In I98',  the public  sector  was responsible  for 62X
of  the  forcign debt,  while  in 1987 this proportion  increased  to
75%.  This  transfer  represented  an external  source  of finance,
despite  the  fact that no new monem  was  available  in  1985  and
1986.  An  additional  reason  for the constancs  of the shares  was
the loss of international  reserves  in 1985/  1986.
The proportion  between  money  and domestic  debt  financing,  on
the other  hand,  has varied  wildl  in the period.  Using  Table  2
and  the  IGP-DI  as  the  deflator  for  the domestic  debt,  the
proportion  of money  financing  in  total  domestic  financing  was
48%,  42%,  61%,  65%,  196%, and 51%  for the period  1982-87.  The
data  show  an upward  trend  in money  financing,  culminating  in the
strong  domestic  debt  monetiza  'in of 1986 with  the Cruzado  Plan.
The above  proportions,  however,  conceal  the  fact that there  has
been  continuous  small  confiscations  of the domestic  public  debt
in the 80's,  produced  byj  rates  of monetary  correction  short  of
the  effective  inflation  rates.  If we take  1981 as a basis,  the
ORTN  had  lost about  half of its real value  by the  end  of  1987.
Both  the  shift  to  money  financing  and  the  small  debt
-8-confiscations  of  the  recent  years  may  be  at  the  root  of  the
upward  trend  in  the  rate  of  inflation  in  Brazil,  to  the  extent
that  thea  reveal  to  economic  agents  a  basic  intertemporal
inconsistency  in  the  financial  structure  of the  public  sector.
"Above  the  line"  estimates  of  the  public  sector  deficit  in
Brazil  are  not  available.  There  are  only  partial  estimates  fo!
the  deficit  of  the  Federal  government  and  of  the  state
enterprises.  The  estimates  of  Table  4  below  are  to  be  taken
cautiously,  because  some  items  were  obtained  indirectbI,  as
explained  in  the  Table.  The  decomposition  of  the  operational  PSBR
obeys  the  following  equation:
Du  S  +  (r-p)B  +  E(r*+e-P)B*  +  Is  T  (2)
where  r  is the  nominal  domestic  interest  rate  and  r*  is  the
dollar  interest  rate.
The deficit  is  seen  as  the  sum  of  the  basic  balance  (S),  or
the  balance  between  tax  and  other  revenues  and  public  sector
consumption,  domestic  and  foreign  debt  service,  gross  capital
expenditures  Ig,  and  current  transfers  (for social  security,  and
subsidies)  T.
The  domestic  debt  service  has  shown  an  upward  trend  in  the
period,  both  due  to  the  continuous  capitalization  of  very  high
real  interest  rates  and  to  the  financing  of  other  public
expenditure.  The  sharp  fall  in  the  domestic  debt  service  in  1986
was  the  result  of  the  already  mentioned  monetization  of  the
domestic  debt  after  the  Cr-uzado  Plan,  the  peg  of  the  nominal
interest  rate  below  the  effective  rate  of  inflation  for most  of
the  year,  and  the  depreciation  imposed  on  the  real  value  of  the
debt  due  to  the  "de-indexation"  of the  financial  sYjstem.  The
foreign  debt  service  has  shown  a  downward  trend  since  1984,
despi'.e  the  increasing  share  of  the  public  sector  in  the  foreign
debt,  due  to  the  fall  in  the  international  interest  rates.  The
total  debt  service  of the  public  sector  increased  from  1981  to
1985,  and  was  sharpl!  reduced  in  1986  and  1987.  However,  this
fall  should  not  be  expected  to  be  maintained  in  the  future  for
-9-two reasons.  'rirst,  because  the downward  trend  in  the  dollar
interest  rates  reverted  by the end of 1987.  Second,  because  the
strong  monetizatior  of the domestic  public  debt  was  probably  a
once-and-for-all  frustrated  experiment.  The  available  data  for
the  first semester  of 1988 show a sharp  escalation  of  the  real
value  of  the  domestic  debt,  as will be seen  in the  following
section.
The basic  reason  for  concern  about  the  debt  trends  in
Brazil,  however,  is the fact that no significant  effort  has been
made  to correct  budget  imbalances  of the public  sector.  On  the
contrary,  the  non-financial  su-Plus  of  the public  sector  has
fallen  since  1985,  as Table  5 shows.  Unfortunately,  no estimates
for the  structural  (or full-employment)  deficit  are available.  In
spite  of  that,  it  is  a  valid  hypothesis  that the  structural
deficit  has been rising  sharply  since  1985.  Several  indications
support  the hjpothesis.  In the  first place,  the real expenditures
of the Federal  government  itncreased  10% in 1985,  69X  in 1986, and
fell 14% in 1987,  wh.le  the real revenues  increased  only  12X per
sear  in the same period.  As the debt service  remained  constant  in
1985 and  fell in 1986-87,  and the  public  capital  expenditures
were  nearl:  constant,  the  fall  in  the non-financial  deficit
should  be  attributed  to  a  sharp  increase  in  public  sector
consumption  in  the  period.  The  data  therefore  provide  strong
evidence  of a pro-csclical  fiscal  Policy  in 1985 and particularly
in 1986.  The consumption  boom of 1985-86,  when the economy  grew
more  tIan 8% a year,  should  be mainly  explained  by the vigourous
fiscal  stimulus  produced  by the government.
On the other  hand,  the real  prices  of  publicly  produced
goods  and  services  maintained  their  long run downward  trend  in
1985-86,  showing  a partial  recovery  in 1987. Table  6 presents  the
real price  indices  of selected  goods  and  services  produced  bN the
state  enterprises  for 1970 and 1980-87'.  The pricing  policy  for
2.  See  R.f.  Verneck,  "Public  Sector  Adjustment  to  External  Shocks  and  Domestic  Pressures:  197X-
85",  Discussion  Paper  163,  PUC,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  June  1987.
- 10  -these  goods  and services  has  oscillated  between  the  short-run
objective  to alleviate  inflationary  pressures  in the economy  and
the  intention  to  improve the  real  incomes of  the  lower  classes
(the "social"  tariff)  In any case,  this policyJ,  reinforced  in
1985-86,  has  produced  devastating  effects  on  the  financial
structure  of  most  public  enterprises  and  contributed  to the
overall  deficit  of the  public  sector.
The outlook  of the deficit  for 1988  and  beyond  is  highlj
pessimistic.  On the one hand,  the stagnation  of the econom!  after
1986  reduced  public  revenues  and has created  political  pressures
for a further  increase  in government  real  spending.  On the other
hand,  strong  inflationary  pressures  may  inhibit  necessary  real
corrections  of public  prices.  Finallyj, the rapid  "demonetization"
of 1987, as  inflation  resumed,  has  forced  a large  increase  in the
domestic  public  debt  and  in real  interest  rates,  increasing  the
burden  of the debt  for the  future.
3. Fiscal  Policy  and the External  Sector
The  size  and  the extension  of the public  sector  in Brazil
would  make one  suppose  that  fiscal  policy  in a broad  sense  has  a
decisive  influence  on  the  overall  balance  of the economy  and
consequently  on the current  account  of the balance  of  payments.
The  evidence  has  supported  this  hypothesis.  Fiscal  policy
decisions  in response  to autonomous  shocks,  as in the  70's  and
earlY  80's  or  to domestic  political  pressures,  as in 1985-87,
have dramaticallI  changed  the current  account  position.  Table  7
- 11  -decomposes  the  domestic  resource  gap  into  the public  sector
deficit,  measured  by the operational  PSBR,  and the private  sector
resource  balance,  obtained  as a residual,  for the period  1981-87.
The  Table  also  shows  the  composition  of  the  current  account
balance  in terms  of net  imports  of goods  an non-factor  services,
interest  payments,  and other  factor  income.
A persistent  characteristic  of the economy  revealed  in  the
Table  has  been  the  negative  resour-ce  balance  of the private
sector,  resulting  from a complex  crowding-out  process  in  the
financial  markets  to  allow  the  financing  of the public  sector
deficit.  The shift  of the public  sector  from  foreign to domestic
financing  after  1982,  together  with the  incapacits  to reduce  its
deficits  on a permanent  basis,  has  increasingly  required  the  net
use  of  private  savings.  As the decomposition  makes  clear,  the
public  sector  has been  faced with  two  distinct  difficulties:  a
transfer  problem  and  a  transformation  problem.  The  general
transfer  problem  consists  of the need  to generate  net exports  of
goods  and  non-factor  services  of around  3% of GDP each Near  in
order  to serve  the  foreign  debt  and  equilibrate  the  current
account,  since  the net  capital  inflow  has been  almost  zero.  This
in turn  implies  that domestic  expenditure  be 3% short  of domestic
income.  Various  different  policN  mixes  can  accomplish  that
objective.  On the other  hand,  a tranformation  problem  arises  to
the  extent  that  the public  sector  owes  80% of the foreign  debt
and the  private  sector  produces  most  of  the  foreign  exchange
necessary  for  the debt service.  Again,  there  are  a variety  of
means  to effect  the  transfer  of foreign currency  from the private
to the public  sector.  The macroeconomic  behavior  of the  economy
in  the  80's  can  probably  be explained  by the specific  ways  in
which  these  two  problems  have  been  dealt  with  by  economic
policies.
Brazil  was successful  in effecting  the resource  transfer  in
1984-85  through  a  policN  mix  based  on  monetary  and  fiscal
restraint  at first  (1981-82),  and on an aggressive  exchange  rate
policY  thereatfer  (1983-84).  These  policies  were reversed  in the
second  half  of  1985  and  particularlY  in  1986.  The  fiscal
- 12  -expansion  started  in 1985,  followed  by a wild monetary  expansion
in 1986,  and by a real appreciation  of the exchange  rate,  have
been  decisive  in simultaneousl1  producing  a consumption  boom,  a
break-down  in  the current  account,  and a hyperinflation.  This
experience  has  revealed  a series  of  primitive  policy  mistakes
only  understandable  in  the  confuse  and conflicting  political
environment  that has prevailed  since  1985.
An  interesting  evideqce  of the effect  of  fiscal  policy  on
the  current  account  is  provided  bb  Figure  1,  where  the net
exports  of goods  an non-factor  services  (NEX)  are  correlated  to
the  public  sector  non-financial  deficit  (DEF).  The overall  debt
service  has been neglected,  since  it  represents  a  contractual
obligation  not  responsible  to fiscal  actions  in the short-run.
There  is a clear  correlation  between  the  intensity  of the  fiscal
correction  of  1983-84  (and of the  fiscal  expansion  of 1985-87)
and  the size of the NEX variable.  The year  to bear  correlation  is
not  higher  becduse  there  are probably  lags  in  the  response  to
fiscal  policy.  A  moving  average  or some other  smoothing  procedure
can  not be applied,  however,  given  the small  size of the sample.
On  the  other hand,  it can  be said  that Brazil has  not yet
found  an efficient  wab to deal  with  the transformation  problem  of
the  public  sector.  The problem  has  been  further  aggravated  by the
continuous  transfer  of the  foreign  debt  from the private  to  the
public  sector,  consequent  on the successive  debt  renegociations
after  1982,  and by the general  and profound  disorganization  and
lack  of control  of the public  sector  itself.  By the end  of 1987,
the  foreign debt  of the public  sector  was US$  90.7  billion,  of
which  57% was  owed by the central  government  (Federal  government
and  Central  Bank),  37% bb the public  enterprises,  and 6% by the
state  and  municipal  governments.  A first problem  arising  from
this  distribution  is that  some state  enterprises  and  most  state
and  municipal  governments  fail to serve  their  debt  for several
reasons:  price  controls  over  public  goods  and  services,
incapacity  to generate  operational  surpluses,  excess  indebtedness
caused  bb  malinvestments,  low  productivity,  political
opportunism,  and  so on  Several  internal  transfer  mechanisms  have
- 13 -been established  in the public  sector  in order  to cope  with  the
ocasional  or sYstematic  defaults,  usually  implying  the assumption
of  the  burden  by the Central  Bank,  which  has  accumulated  large
credits  of improbable  recuperation  against  other  segments  of  the
public  sector.
Different  alternatives  have  been  proposed  to solve  this
problem  and give  a better  chance  to the Central  Bank to follow  a
more  independent  monetary  policy.  One alternative  is to make  the
consumer  Pay  for the debt service,  through  higher  real prices  in
the  ase of public  goods  and services.  In some cases,  however,
this  ma! be impossible  (an urban  sub-wa!  system  or an expressway,
for  instance),  or not optimal  on efficiency  grounds,  as in  the
case  of malinvestments,  low productivity  or  7ictitious  debt  (debt
contracted  for  balance  of payments  reasons  and  not effectively
used by the enterprise).  A second  alternative  is to  consolidate
the  excess  debt  in  the  central  government,  serving  it by a
general  and  proportional  income  tax  surcharge.  A  third  way
consists  of  establishing  a  fund  of  compulsory  savings  to
capitalize  the  state  enterprises,  tne  return  on  which  would
depend  on their  future  profit  prospects.  No one of these  or other
alternatives  have  been  worked  out  so far,  with  the consequence
that an important  additional  pressure  is put on the  monetary  or
debt  policy  of the  Central  Bank.
Besides  the  financial  and cash  transfers  inside  the public
sector,  usually  involving  the Central  Bank as a lender  of  last
resort,  a more substantive  problem  from a macroeconomic  point  of
view  is the mechanism  by which  the  Public  sector  "buys"  foreign
exchange  or,  in other  words,  how  the public  sector  finances  its
foreign  debt service.  This problem  can not be divorced  from  the
overall  financing  of the public  sector,  and they will be treated
together.
An increase  in  the  non-financial  burplus  of  the  public
sector  could  be  brought  about  by one  or more of the  following
means:  increase  in the tax burden,  expenditure  cuts,  and  sale of
assets.  Attempts  at increasing  taxes  at the margin  (not through  a
real  tax  reform)  have  been  frustrated  by the offseting  response
- 14  -of  the  private  sector,  either  increasing  tax  evasion  or
stubmerging  into  the underground  economy.  The tax base does not
seem  to be independent  of the tax  rates,  but to change  inversely
with  it.  Expenditure  cuts have  been blocked  by a coallision  of
bureaucratic,  political  and private  interests  (in  the  case  of.
subsidies).  Sales  of  government  assets  and privatization  have
faced  the  same  obstacles  as  expenditures  cuts.  The  non-
traditicnal  means  of reducing  the public  debt  (both domestic  and
foreign)  through  schemes  of debt  conversion  have  attracted  some
atztention, but no important  steps  have been  taken  so far.
Therefore,  the government  has relied  basically  on money  and
debt  financing,  complemented  by small  debt  confiscations  from
time  to time.  Table  8 presents  the composition  of the  financial
assets  in Brazil,  separated  into  liabilities  of the  governments
and  of  government-owned  financial  agencies,  and  liabilities  of
private  financial  institutions.  The public  sector  participation
of  more  than  4/5 in the total  assets  is in fact underestimated,
to the  extent  that  the  53X  required  reserve  rate  on  demand
deposits  is left out.  Also the  classification  of savings  deposits
as  a  private  liability  is onls  formal,  because  of the  long run
insolvency  of the National  Housing  System.  In any  case,  it  is
clear  that  the  largest  part of private  savings  is channelled
through  the public  financial  institutions.  Part of that goes  to
the  financing  of the public  sector  itself,  and part  is lent to
the private  sector,  mostly  in  the  form  of  selective  credit
programs.
Due  to  the  massive  presence  of the public  sector  in the
financial  markets,  the  instability  of  the  rules  of  the  game
regarding  financial  assets  and operations,  the high  and unstable
rate  of  inflation,  and  the  previous  experiences  with  debt
confiscations.  the  private  sector  has  developed  several
protective  schemes,  largeIy  based  on the shortening  of maturities
of the  financial  instruments  or,  in  the  Lase  of  government
securities,  based  on  the  "tailoring"  of maturities.  It can  be
safely  said that presently  the totality  of financial  assets  have
maturities  shorter  than  60 days,  80X  shorter  than  30 days,  and
- 15 -50X  shorter  than 24 hours.  The  outstanding  government  securities
are  in fact transformed  in a kind of indexed  money,  in the  sense
that  they are used as backing  for  over-night  deposits  earning
approximately  the  rate of inflation.
An important  implication  of these  developments  and  financial
innovations  for  monetary  Policy  is that of making  the monetary
base  largely  endogenous.  Besides  the  traditional  source  of
monetary  endogeneitY  in  an  open  economy  linlwe-d  to balance  of
payments  flows,  two  additional  mechanisms  exist  in  Brazil.  The
first  one  operates  through  the secondary  market  for government
securities.  As these  securities  serve  as baLking  for  over-night
depos  's  (formalIy  by 24 hour  repurchase  agreements),  any shift
between  money  and  indexed  money  or other  financial  assets  in the
portfolio  of the private  sector  produces  an equivalent  shift  in
the composition  of the  outstanding  government  debt  (high-powered
money  and securites),  through  the  open-market  operations  of the
Central  Bank  The  second  linkage  comes  through  the  savings
deposits,  which  pay  a  fixed  interest  rate  above  monetary
correction.  Depending  on the difference  between  market  rates  and
that  fixed  rate,  financial  resources  flow in or out of savings
deposits,  requiring  the  intervention  of the Central  Bank  as  the
lender  of  last  resort  to that  segment  of the  financial  market,
either  providing  liquidity,  of  absorbing  excess  liquidity.  The
enormous  mass  of liquid assets  in the economy  can produce  large
and  instantaneous  shifts  in  portfolios  in  response  to  market
conditions  or  to  short-term  expectations,  and  therefore  may
become  a  source  of  financial  and  monetary  instability.  The
current  structure  of  the  Brazilian  financial  system  has put  a
tight  constraint  on  the  use  of  the  traditional  policy
instruments,  in particular  those  of monetaryg  policy.
The  Brazilian  exchange  rate policy,  except  for two  fancy
experiments  in 1980 and  in 1986,  has been  quite  stable  bs Latin-
American  standards,  and  has  roughly  maintained  the
competitiveness  of the export  sector.  The general  rule has  been
daily  devaluations  according  to the domestic  rate of inflation,
measured  by  some  standard  price  index  (See  Table  9).  The
- 16  -experiment  of  1980 consisted  of the announcement  (six months  in
advance)  of  the  rate  of  devaluation.  This  Argentine  style
experiment,  the  purpose  of which  was to influence  inflationary
expectations,  produced  a large  real appreciation,  corrected  in
February,  1983 bN a 20*  devaluation.  The experiment  of 1986 came
in the wake  of the Cruzado  Plan,  when  the  exchange  rate  was
frozen  for nine  months,  again  producing  a real appreciation  that
has  not Net  been  corrected.9
Tie exchange  rate policy  has traditionaly  oscillated  between
two  conflicting  objectives:  to maintain  the  competitiveness  of
the  export  sector  and  to dampen  domestic  inflationary  pressures
The trade-off  between  these  two  policN  objectives  can  become
quite  unfavorable  in an indexed  economy.  A real depreciation  can
onIy  be  brought  about  and  sustained  at  the  cost  of  an
acceleration  in the  rate of inflation  to a new higher  level,  to
the extent  that  the  depreciation  transmits  to  the  different
cathegories  of  incomes  through  the  increase  in tradeable  goods
prices.  A simple  evidence  of the trade-off  is given  in Figure  2,
where  the  annual  rate of  inflation  is correlated  te the level  of
the  real exchange  rate  for the period  1975-87  (the coefficient  of
determination  of the regression  is 88% excluding  the bear  1987).
In more  recent  Nears,  an additional  constraint  has  existed
on  the  exchange  rate  policY,  given  by  the  impact  of a real
depreciation  on the  foreign  debt of the public  sector.  A 10% real
depreciation  produces  a capital  loss to the  public  sector  of  3%
of  GDP,  and an annual  real  increase  in its foreign  debt service
of around  0.25%  of GDP  at current  world  interest  rates.
The general  conclusion  that  arises  form  this  analIsis  is
that  the  traditional  instruments  of economic  policN  in Brazil,
for different  reasons,  have  lost their  efficacy  in managing  the
economy  and  in  contributing  to  a  reasonable  macroeconomic
3. cf.  C.L.  Ilartone  and  C.A.P.  Braga,  "Brazil  and  the  Urugua!y  Round", Conference  on  The
Multilateral  Trade Negotiations and  the  Developing Countries.  The Rockefeller  Foundation
Washington,  D.C., September, 1988.
- 17  -stability.  It seems  that  the time  has  come  for  institutional
reforms  that  could  rescue the economic policy from the present
deadlock, and permit a better macroeconomic  performance.
4.  Fiscal  Policy and  Stabilization
It is clear  at this point  of the analysis  that stabilization
programs  applied  within  the  present  Brazilian  institutional
setting  are  likely  to fail for at  least two reasons.  First,  the
scope  for the management  of the  traditional  policy  instruments  is
too  restricted,  and second  because  private  agents  know  that  and
therefore  have  no  reason  to  change  their  inflationary
expectations.  Of course  any stabilization  program  can be more  or
less competentlyi designed  and  implemented,  and that  can  make  a
difference  in  its duration  and  degree  of failure  (the situation
after  the Plan  is abandoned  can be the same  or worse).
Looked  at from the above  point  of  view,  the  two  recent
stabilization  plans  in Brazil  (the Cruzado  Plan  of Februaryj, 1986
and  the Bresser  than of June,  1987)  could  not have  succeded.  More
than that,  however,  ther have  led to a much worse  situation  than
the one  they attempted  to correct,  because  of  poor  design  and
incompetent  implementation
The  ke!  theoretical  issues  of  a  stabilization  Program
applied  to a chr-onic  and  moderate  inflation  (three-digit  "only"),
contrary, to an open hyperinflation,  are the nature  and  d!namics
of the  inflation  process.  The theoretical  basis  for the so-called
"heterodox  shocks"  recently  implemented  in Argentina  and Brazil
is that chronic  inflation  is essentially  inertial,  being  produced
- 18  -bN staggered  prices  and wage  adjustments.  Assume  an inflationars
economy  in  which  the  price  of  each  good,  service  and  asset
(except  money)  adjust  at a definite  interval,  and  there  is  a
continuum  of such  intervals.  If this economs  does not suffer  any
supply  or demand  shock,  it  will  converge  to  a  steady  state
situation  in  which  the rate of  inflation  will  be constant,  the
average  relative  prices  (over  the period  of adjustment)  will  be
in  equilibrium,  real  output  will be constant,  and  the average
functional  shares  in total  income  will  be  invariant.  The  onily
problem  with  inflation,  in  this  case,  is  the  social  cost
associated  with  a  sub-optimal  allocation  of  resources:
individuals  use  less money  than they would  under  price  stability
and the  financial  sector  uses  too much  real  resources.  In  any
other  aspect,  inflation  is neutral.  That  is the best case one  can
make  for the  inertial  hypothesis  of  inflation.
In  such  an economs,  the government  is generating  a budget
deficit  and  financing  it  bs  printing  money  to  the  extent
necessary  to  sustain  the  current  rate of  inflation.  Money  is
passive,  in the sense  that,  if the rate of inflation  eventually
rises  aS  a consequence  of autonomous  suppl!  or demand  shocks,  the
government  will  adjust  the  rate of money  creation  automatically.
The  relevant  variable  for any economic  agent  is,  in this
case,  his  average  price  or his average  real  income  (over  his
period  of price  adjustment).  If it were possible  to convince  the
economic  agents  at a point  in time to  convert  their  prices  to
their  average  over  the  longest period  of adjustment  prevailing  in
the economy  and  to keep them constant  thereafter,  inflation  would
terminate  instantaneoulsyj and  the stabilization  would  be neutral
with  respect  to  relative  prices  and  income  shares.  The
inflationary  memory  of  the  economy  would  be eliminated  in the
sense  that past changes  in the price  level  would  be  irrelevant
for  current  and  future  decisions.  Inflationary  inertia would
completely  disappear.  On its turn,  the government  would  assume
the  compromise  to  keep  the  money  supply  constant  after  the
stabilization  by  eliminating  any  residual  budget  deficit  or
financing  it  entirelj  by  issuing  bonds.  A  once-and-for-all
- 19  -increase  in the  quantitN  of money  would  be necessary  to meet  the
higher  real demand  after  the  stabilization,  in order  to avoid  a
temporary  deflation.
Is there  anNthing  theoretically  wrong  with  the  above  model
of inertial  inflation  besides  its obvious  practical  or real world
difficulties?  The  error  consists  of considering  the economic
process  as a cooperative  game,  in  which  each  individual  will
voluntarily  respect  the rule of the  game  in order  to accomplish
the overall  result.  UnfortunateIy  perhaps,  that  is an idealistic
vision  of the world  and  of the  social  and  economic  processes.
Except  for legal or other  kinds  of coertion,  each  individual  will
have  an incentive  to cheat,  by fixing  his price  above  the average
to  start  with.  That  is why  a general  price  freeze  enforced  by
some  government  authority  is  found  necessary  to  produce
stabilization.  The price  freeze,  however,  implies  that relative
prices  will be set at "wrong"  levels  at a point  in time,  and  that
the  inflationary  memory  of the ecunomy  can not  be  washed  out.
The  program  then  eventually  fails,  to  the  extent  that  the
individuals  succeed  in setting  their  relative  prices  where  they
would  be  without  the  freeze.  The  failure  of such a program,
therefore,  is a necessary  consequence  of its flawed  vision  of the
world.  It is a question  of practical  details  the extent  of  the
failure  and  its economic  consequences.
Besides  the  theoretical  objection  to  the basis  of the
"heterodox  shock",  the design  of the Cruzado  and  Bresser  Plans
suffered  from  additional  conceptual  mistakes  and  omissions,  of
which  the most  important  were:
(i)  No compromise  to eliminate  any  residual  deficit  was assumed
bs the government.  It turned  out  soon after  the Plan  that
the deficit  was not only high but  rising.
(ii)  Nothing  was  done  to  change  the structure  of the Central
Bank,  either  by  making  it  legally  independent  of  the
government,  or by prohibiting  it from financing  the public
sector.
(iii)  Inflation  was  accelerating  at the  moment  of  the  freeze,
meaning  that  relative  prices  were adjusting.  The choice  of
- 20  -the  D-day  was  dictated  b!  dispair  rather  than  reason,
magnifNing  the relative  price  distortions  in the economy.
(iv)  In  case  of  the  Cruzado  Plan,  there  was a complete  de-
indexation  of the exchange  rate,  the  fiscal  system,  the
financial  markets,  and  of contracts  in general,  at the same
time  that  an  over-indexation  of  wages  was  introduced
through  an escalator  clause  with  a  trigger  at  20X  of
accumulated  inflation.  This  was  done on top of a 8X real
wage  increase  at the start  of the Plan.  The trigger  turned
out  to  be  a  constraint  on  the management  of aggregate
demand  and retarded  necessary  price  adjustments.  It  was
clear  at the start,  thus,  that the economy  would  on'l  reach
a  new  inflationary  equilibrium  with  a  monthly  rate of
inflation  of at least 20X,  as in fact happened  in the  first
semester  of  1987.  In  case  of  the  Bresser  Plan,  the
indexation  system  remained,  but  a lagged  wage  indexation
was  introduced,  which  alterwards  set  the pace  for the  rate
of inflation.
The  implementation  of economic  policy  in the period  February
86 - January  88  (covering  the  two stabilization  program)  was  even
worsr  than  its conception.
The  fiscal  expansion  produced  by  increasing  government
consumption,  huge credit  subsidies  (to  the  extent  that  the
nominal  interest  rate on selective  credit  programs  was kept  fixed
at  I1X  per  Near),  and  lagged  real prices  of public  goods  and
services  during  1986,  in a situtation  of near  full-employment  and
full capacitN  use,  led to the run-down  of  inventories  in  the
first  semester  of the Near,  and the  run-down  of foreign  exchange
reserves  in the second  semester.
The price  freeze February  1986,  because  of promises  of zero
inflation  and  the  fear of the effects  of the wage  trigger,  was
sustained  too  long (up  to  November  15,  the  date  of  general
elections),  so  that  an automatic  mechanism  to reduce  aggregate
demand  (price level  increase)  was  locked.  In the second  half  of
the  Near,  general  rationing  prevailed  in  the goods  markets,
- 21  -generating a potential inflationary surge  that  materialized  in
1987.  (See Figure  3).
Immediately  after  the deflagration  of the Cruzado  Plan,  thc
Central  Bank engaged  in a large monetization  of the public  debt,
Partly  to  reduce  its  interest  burden,  partly  to keep nominal
interest  rates  at the  same  level of real  rates  before  the  Plan
(under  the assumption  of a zero  rate of inflation),  and partly  to
provide  for the  increase  in the real demand  for money  consequent
of the  stabilization.  The guide  of monetary  policY  during  this
period  was the nominal  interest  rate.  The Central  Bank pegged  the
rate,  creating  whatever  amount  of  money  was  necessary.  The
bahavior  of real  financial  assets  and  money  in  the  critical
turning  points  associated  with the  Plan  is presented  in Table  10.
The  real  quantity  of money  increased  216X between  January,  and
October  1986,  and  fell 61X between  October,  1986 and Jutie,  1987,
as the  inflation  process  resumed.  The behavior  of monetary  policy
had  an  important  contribution  in stimulating  a gregate  demand  and
creating  a repressed  inflation  in the economy.
After  two succesive  months  with  rates  of  inflation  above  26X
per month,  the governmert  precipitated  a new  price  freeze, known
as the  Bresser  Plan  (June  1987).  Although  the  new  program
succeded  in reversing  the rate  of inflation  temporarily.  it was
not  followed  by any  supporting  fiscal  and monetary  measures.  The
result  has,  been  a  rapid  reinflation  to a level above  the one
prevailing  before  the Plan  .See Figure  3).
The Brazilian  recent  experiences  of stabilization,  although
not Net  completed,  has taught  some  important  lessons.  First  of
all,  it has  shown  that the  inertial  hypothesis  of  inflation  is a
good  description  of the djnamics  of  inflation,  but  is  not  a
theory  on  the  nature  of  inflation.  The proposed  remedy  (the
"heterodox  shock")  consequently  can  not  be  successfulIs
implemented.  Second,  the  attempted  application  of that kind  of
shock  destroNs  the spontaneous  operation  of the price  system  by
suppressing  the  information  content  conveyed  by  prices  and
disarticulates  the  production  process  and  the  allocation  of
- 22  -resources.  The social cost of so doing may be prohibitive in the
long  run,  but  the political cost of a  return to a market econom!
may be  predominant in the  short  run.  Therefore,  once  a  government
engages  in  such  an  experiment,  it  is  led  to  repeat  it
periodically in order to survive. The countr-ies  that entered this
path are likely to remain for a  long  time  .nder  a  controlled
economy.  sacrificing  their  growth  potential on behalf of some
stability  in  the  income  distribution  and  a  less  explosive
inflation  path.  Evertually  this  "muddling-through"  policy may
break down,  precipitating a hyperinflation  and  the  consequent
structural  changes,  but this does not seem to be an imminent or
even a nec  sary outcome. 4
4.  At  the  vonent  this  paper  was  revised  for  publication  (February,  1989) a new  stabilization
program  was  inderwaN  (the  Summer  Plan  of  Januars,  1989),  based  on  a  general  price  freeze  and  the
de-indexation  of  the  economN.  Its  fate  does  not  look  different  from  the  previous  ones.
- 23  -TABLE I
BRAZIL:  ALTERNATIVE  MEASURES  OF  PUBLIC  SECTOR  BORROWING
REQUIREMENTS
(PER CENT OF GDP)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PSBR' '  NDPS'''
Nominal  Operational  Nominal  Real
1981  £2.5  5.2  - -
1962  15.8  7.0  27.7  7.1
£983  18.6  3.5  61.8  9.3
1984  e3.8  2.7  60.8  4.2
1985  27.9  4.3  64.1  4.9
1986  10.8  3.5  21.2  1.6
i927  29 5  5.5  75.2  3.7
Source:  Central  Bank  of  Brazil:  Brazil  Economic Program and
Monthlyg  Bulletin.
(1)  Refers to the  IMF  concept  for  the  non-financial  public
sector.  The  .operational"  deficit  excludes  monetary
correction and devaluation of exchange rate from the  public
debt.
(2)  Computed  on the basis of Table 1.  The "real" change in the
Net Debt of the Public sector refers  to  the  deflated  (by
IOP-DI)  change  in  all  items of debt (except the monetaryg
base), plus the change in the monetary base.
- 24  _TAKLE  2
BRAZIL:  NET  DEST  OF  THE  PUILIC  SECTOR`" 
(positions  in December)
Ca$  billion
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
i. Total  Public  Debt  8.5  21.8  94.8  330.5  1231.4  213.1  11634.9
2.  Domestic  Public  Debt  3.8  9.7  34.1  1308  501.5 823.2  5112.0
2.1.  Government  Securities  2.4  5.2  16.4  69.2 293.7 410.8  2691.5
Federal  2.0  4.2  13.7  60.7 260.2 349.4  2292  .6
State  and  Nunicipal  0.4  1.4  2.7  8.5  33.5  61.4  398.9
2.2.  NonetarS  Base  1.0  2.O  3.5  12.7  45.5 178.9  503.5
2.3.  Net  Debt  to  Financial
Sector  0.4  2.5  14.2  48.9 162.3  233.5  1917.0
Non-Financial  Public
Sector""b  2.5  7.0  23.7  77.4 30.7  541.1  2508.2
Central  Bank"C'  (2.1)  (4.5)  (9.5)  (28.5)  (138.4)  (307.6)  (591.2)
3.  Foreign  Public  Debt  4.7  12.1  60.7  199.7  729.9  1189.9 6522.9
3.1.  Federal  Government
and  Central  Dank  0.7  2.4  19.2  83.5 284.7  572.2  4235.6
3.2.  State  and  Municipal
Government  and  Public
Enterprises  4.3  9.4  38.6  133.8  503.6 673.0  2790.6
3.3.  Deposits  in  Foreign
Currencs")  0.6  1.2  6.8  18.4  51.0  45.2  --
3.4.  International  Reserves  (0.9)  (0.9)  (3.9)  (36.0)  (109.4)  (100.5)  (503.3)
Source:  Central  Dank,  Drazil,  Economic  Program,  several  issues.
(a)  Defined  as  the  non-financial  public  sector  plus  the  Central  Dank.
(b)  Includes  arrears  to  contractors  and  suppliers.
(c)  Net  domestic  credit  to  financial  systeu  (inclusive  of  Banco  do  Drasil).
(d)  Private  sector  deposits  only.
- 25  -TADLE  3
BRAZIL:  NET  DEIT  OF  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR"a'
(positions  in  December)
COS  billion  of  1994
1981  1982  19m  1984  1985  1986  1987
1.  Total vublic  Debt  171.4  219.6  396.9  330.5  367.5  364.0  447.8
2.  Domestic  Public  Debt  76.5  97.7  110.4  130.8  149.7  148.8  19.2
2.1.  overnment  Securities  49.3  52.4  53.1  69.2  87  6  74.3  94.4
Federal  41.2  42.3  44.4  60.7  77.6 63.2  90.4
State  and  Municipal  8.4  10.1  8.7  8.5  10.  1I.1  14.0
.2.  2onetar  base  20.1  24.1  11.3  12.7  13.6 32.3  17.7
2.3.  Net  Debt  to  Financial
Sector  8.1  25.2  46.0  48.9  48.4 42.4  67.2
Non-Financial  Public
Sector  50.3  74.5  76.7  77.4  89.7 97.8  87.9
Central  Bank  (42.2)  (45.3)  (30.7)  (28.5)  (41.3)  '55.6) 207
3.  Forsign  Public  Debt  94.5  121.9  196.5  199.7  217.9  215.2  228.6
3.1.  Federal  Government
and  Central  Dank  14.1  24.2  62.2  83.5  95.  103.5  148.5
3.2.  State  and  Municipal
Government  and  Public
Enterprises  86.4  94.7  125.4  133.8 150.3  121.7  97.8
3.3.  Deposits  in  Foreign
Currency  12.1  12.1  22.0  18.4  15.2  9.2  --
3.4.  International  Reserves  (18.1)  (9.1)  (12.6)  (36.4)  (32.7)  (18.2)  (17.6)
Sources  and  criteria:  see  Table  2.
(a)  Deflated  by  the  IGP-DI  of  the  Fundagio  Getulio  Vargas.
- 26  -TAKLE  4
IRAZIL:  CONPOITION  Of THE  PUtLIC  SECTOR  DEFICIT
(PER  CENT  OF  GOP)
Years  Operational  Basic Dalance  Do estic  Foreign  Gross Fixed  Domestic
PSUR  (Surplus)  Debt  Service  Debt  Service  Capital  Foreation  Transfers
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
1991  5.20  -16.91  1.50  2.08  7.64  10.89
1982  7.0  -16.85  2.37  2.49  7.53  11.46
19m  3.50  -19.11  3.6  3.22  5.49  10.84
1984  2.70  -18.19  3.30  3.14  5.20  9.25
1985  4.30  -16.12  3.44  2.97  5.43  8.58
1986  3.50  -15.27  2.23  2.51  5.0  9.03
1987  5.50  -12.17  2.17  2.10  5.0  8.40
Notes;
col.(2):  Obtained  as residual.
col.(3):  The  cost  (above  aonetary  correction)  of  the  Federal  debt  in  securities  given  bs  the  the
central  Dank.  The:  cost  of  the  net  debt  to  financial  sector  estimated  on  the  basis  of
average  CD  rates  in  the  earket  (30.9,  27.4,  24.3,  23.8.  23.1,  14.01.  and  15X  per  Near
for  the  sears  1981-87).
col(4):  Estiaated  applying  the  share  of the  public  sector  in  the  total  foreign  debt  on  the
annual  interest  cost,  minus  the  interest  earned  on  international  reserves,  assumed  to  be
31  below  the  average  cost  of  debt.
col(S):  Taken  from  Verneck  (1987),  Table  36,  page  47,  complemented  by  National  Income  Accounts.
Estimates  for  1986-87.
col.(6):  National  Income  Accounts  (includes  social  security  and  subsidies).
- 27  -TABLE  5
BRAZIL:  PUBLIC  SECTOR  NON-FINANCIAL  DEFICIT
(per  cent  of GDP)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------
Years  Operational  Public  Sector  Public  Sector
PSBR  Debt  Service  Non-Fin.  Deficit
(1)  (2)  (3)  - (1)  - (2)
1981  5.20  3.58  1.62
1982  7.00  4.86  2.14
1983  3.50  6.28  -2.78
1984  2.70  6.44  -3.74
1985  4.30  6.41  -2.11
1986  3.50  4.74  -1.24
1987  5.50  4.27  1.23
------------------------------------------------------------------- __-------
Source Table  4.
- 28  -TALE  6
AUIL:  REAL  PRICE  INDICES  OF  PUDLICLY  PRODUCED  GOODS  AND  SERVICES
(193.100)
Y-ears  Electricity  Telecouuunicationfs  Flat  Postal  Gasoline  Diesel  Fuel Liquid
Steel  Services  Oil  Oil  Gas
1970  124  - 141  28  39  53  31  114
1990  100  1to  1to  100  1H  I  100  10
1981  14  109  103  9  119  141  98
1982  98  82  108  10N  88  119  126  H
1983  95  68  96  78  81  121  136  9
1984  79  59  103  57  77  122  142  105
985  8  48  1#5  69  67  108  132  91
1986  76  51  69  76  73  74  Be  61
1987  92  44  70  85  60  81  100  76
Sources:  Verneck  (1987),  page  45  for  1970-85,  and  Central  Dank  of Brazil,  Brazil  Economic
Program,  tor  1986-87.
- 29  -TAILE  7
DRAZIL:  CINPOSITION  Of  THE  DONESTIC  RESORMCE  SAP
(per cent  of SDP)
Nut  Internst  Paments  Other  Current  Operational  Private
Tears  Net  Imports Public Private  Total  factor  ccount  PSBR  Sector
of  6  NFS  Sector Sector  Income Deficit  Dalance
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
1981  0.40  2.08  1.79  3.87  0.14  4.41  5.20  -0.79
1992  -1.05  2.49  1.75  4.24  *.22  3.41  7.00  -3.59
1983  -1.97  3.22  1.45  4.67  0.37  3.07  3.50  -4.43
1984  -5.36  3.14  1.68  4.82  0.38  -A.16  2.70  -2.86
1985  -4.79  2.97  1.29  4.26  0.47  -0.06  4.30  -4.36
1986  -2.29  2.51  *.84  3.35  0.46  1.52  3.50  -1.98
1987  -2.71  2.10  0.42  2.52  0.28  -0.49  5.50  -5.59
Note:  Column  (8)  obtained  as  a  residual.
Source:  Balance  of  pasnents  statistics  and  Table  4.
- 30  -TABLE  8
BRAZIL:  COMPOSITION  OF THE  FINANCIAL  ASSETS
(December.  1997)
Public  Sector  Liabilits  Private  Sector  Liabilits
Cz$  billion  X  Cz$  billion  X
Currency  271.6  - --  --
Demand  Deposits  370.7  47.1  416.9  52.9
Time  Deposits  241.7  27.7  719.4  72.3
Savings  Deposits  1239.5  60.1  822.4  39.9
Government  Securities  9006.4  100  0  --  --
Exchange  Bills  --  --  72.5  100.0
Total  Assets  11129.9  84.6  2031.2  15.4
Source:  Central  Bank  Bulletin.
- 31  -TABLE  9
BRAZIL:  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  INDICES
(1975=100)
Years  RER/  USA  REER  IPE
(1)  (2)  (3)
1975  100.0  100.0  190.0
1976  95 6  96  5  102.0
1977  95.3  97.0  105.0
1978  95.1  1,2.5  106.2
1979  102.4  113.0  117.3
1980  110.3  121.9  107.5
1981  102.2  101.5  101.2
1982  104.6  96.5  101.1
1983  126.9  115.5  110.6
1984  123.7  108.6  98.9
1985  125.9  109.4  94.5
1986  112.2  113.0  97.6
1987  111.7  116.1  100.3
Sources: iMartone  and  Braga,  op.cit.,  Table  II,  and  INPES/IPEA
Notes:  Col. (l):  Real  exchange  rate (Cz$/  USS)  based  on wholesale  price
indices.
Col  (2):  Real effective exchange rate  Countries  and  weights
considered  were: USA  (41.5%), W.  German!j  (14.6X),
Japan  (11.3X),  Argentina (7.1%),  Italy (7.2X),
Netherlands  (6.8X),  France  (5.7X),  and  UK (5.7X).
Col. (3): Index  of profitability  of exports  (REER corrected by
export  subsidies).
- 32  -TAKLE  t0
3AZIL:  MEVUU  IF  Lt  1WXIAL  AS£1
Jaaur3,  1986  October,  1986  June,  I7  Otober,  198
Real  Value X  Share Real  Value  I Share  Real  Value  S  Shire  Real  Valve  X  S;are
(1; k^}  ~~~i3  (4;  (5)  to)  !?;  iSi
1. be3  (!  t  lU  11.2  316  27.3  123  13.5  73  8.3
2. FinaKial  Assets  1N  E8.7  IF  72.7  to  86.5  78  91.7
Savings  Dqosits  to  29.2  96  21.4  107  3.7  113  33.5
Tin  beosits  IN  18.6  14  21.0  93  16.9  68  12.8
Exche  lills  1I  4.0  1t2  3.1  31  1.2  13  .5
Governmnt  Secirities  1t  36.9  76  27.2  16  37.6  Il  44.9
3. Total  Assets  10  IN.0  131  100.  102  I1.I  99  1N.0
Surce:  Cntral  lnk hbiletin.
- 33  -FIGURE I
FISCAL  POLICY  AND THE CURRENT  ACCOUNT
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- 34 -FIGURE  2
INFLATION  AND THE REAL EXCHANGE  RATE
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- 35 -FIGURE  3
BRAZIL:  BASIC  INDICATORS  (1986-1987)
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